1. FOREIGN INFORMATIONAL LOBBYING CAN ENHANCE TOURISM: EVIDENCE FROM THE CARIBBEAN. Journal of Development Economics, 2009.  Paper (.pdf)

Bottom Line: Foreigners lobby the U.S. government as much as domestic lobbies do — sometimes with good effect.

2.  WHAT GOVERNMENTS MAXIMIZE AND WHY: THE VIEW FROM TRADE. International Organization, 2009.  paper (.pdf)

Bottom Line: Why some governments follow policies that are welfare-oriented is not necessarily because they are inherently altruistic, but because their country’s institutions constrain their behavior. Where institutional restraints are absent or weak, governments sell out their public’s interest cheaply.

3.  DEALING WITH WEAK INSTRUMENTS: APPLICATION TO THE `PROTECTION FOR SALE’ MODEL. Political Analysis, 2009.  Paper (.pdf)

Bottom Line: Diagnosing weak instruments is important to the satisfactory solution of the endogeneity problem.  Alternative methods in the presence of weak instruments can provide robust inferences.

4.  MORE INEQUALITY MORE KILLINGS: THE MAOIST INSURGENCY IN NEPAL. Bush School Working paper, 2008.  Paper (.pdf)

Bottom Line: Economic polarization and inequality are worse enemies than you think.

5.  UNDERLYING DIMENSIONS OF KNOWLEDGE ASSESSMENT: FACTOR ANALYSIS OF KAM DATA.  World Bank Working Paper, 2007.  Paper (.pdf)

Bottom Line: Step-by-step demonstration of how to do factor analysis and interpret the results.

6.  THRESHOLD EXTERNALITIES IN INTERMEDIATES, SUBSTITUTION ELASTICITIES AND MANUFACTURING WAGES. Bush School Working paper, 2008.  Paper (.pdf)

Bottom Line: Coordination failures can lead to under-development by preventing the birth of high value-added sectors.