Data
1. Is Protection for Sale? Testing the Grossman-Helpman Model of Endogenous Protection. Review of Economics and Statistics 89, 139-152. February 2000. [GAWANDE, K., U. BANDYOPADHYAY]
Bottom Line: The Grossman-Helpman model tests out well against U.S. data. A puzzle left unresolved is why the estimate of the weight the U.S. government places on welfare is so large. This finding is at odds with the fact that the quantity of campaign contributions in the United States is modest relative to the huge welfare losses caused by trade policy distortions. That is, a small amount of contributions bend policy a lot.
DATA: Data (Stata) Documentation (.doc)
2. What Governments Maximize and Why: The View from Trade. International Organization 63, 491-532. July 2009. [GAWANDE, K., P. KRISHNA, and M. OLARREAGA]
Bottom Line: Why some governments follow policies that are welfare-oriented is not necessarily because they are inherently altruistic, but because their institutions constrain their behavior. Where institutional restraints are absent or weak, governments sell out their public’s interest cheaply
DATA: table3data_online table3_code_online ghdta.dta table1_code_online
3. Trade Diversion and Declining Tariffs: Evidence from Mercosur. Journal of International Economics 64, October 2004, 65-88. Reprinted in Freund, C. (ed.) The WTO and Reciprocal Preferential Trading Agreements. UK: Edward Elgar, 2007. [BOHARA A. K., K. GAWANDE, and P. SANGUINETTI]
Bottom Line: Trade diversion can decrease the political influence of a domestic industry, and cause the tariff in that industry to decline.
DATA: t113 t124 regressions
4. Fundamental Dimensions Underlying the Regulation of U.S. Trade. Journal of International Economics 65(1), 2005: 93-125. [BOHARA, A. K., A. I. CAMARGO, T. GRIJALVA, and K. GAWANDE]
Bottom Line: Interest dominates trade policy voting in the Senate. Party dominates trade policy voting in the House. In both chambers, the influence of more than one dimension is evident.
DATA: House8788 Senate8788
5. Foreign Informational Lobbying Can Enhance Tourism: Evidence from the caribbean. Forthcoming in Journal of Development Economics, 2009. [GAWANDE, K., W. MALONEY, and G.V. MONTES-ROJAS]
Bottom Line: Foreigners lobby the U.S. government as much as domestic lobbies do — sometimes with good effect.
DATA: foreignlobbying tables123ado
6. Dealing with Weak Instruments: An Application to the ‘Protection For Sale’ Model. Political Analysis 17, 2009: 236-260. [GAWANDE, K. and HUI LI]
Bottom Line: Weak instruments is a common problem whose diagnosis is necessary. It may be overcome using more robust estimation methods.